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Abstract—This letter studies the practical design of secure
transmissions without knowing eavesdropper’s channel state
information (ECSI). An ECSI-irrelevant metric is introduced
to quantize the intrinsic anti-eavesdropping ability (AEA) that
the transmitter has on confronting the eavesdropper via se-
crecy encoding together with artificial-noise-aided signaling. Non-
adaptive and adaptive transmission schemes are proposed to
maximize the AEA with the optimal encoding rates and power
allocation presented in closed-form expressions. Analyses and
numerical results show that maximizing the AEA is equivalent
to minimizing the secrecy outage probability (SOP) for the worst
case by ignoring eavesdropper’s receiver noise. Therefore, the
AEA is a useful alternative to the SOP for assessing and designing
secure transmissions when the ECSI cannot be prior known.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, anti-eavesdropping abil-
ity, channel state information, artificial noise, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL layer security (PLS), emerging as a promisingparadigm for achieving perfect wireless secrecy against
eavesdropping attacks, has attracted a stream of research
during the past decade [1]. In general, researchers use metrics
such as secrecy capacity [2], ergodic secrecy capacity [3] and
secrecy outage probability (SOP) [4]-[6], to assess the secrecy
level of physical-layer transmissions for different scenarios. As
can be seen, these metrics are highly relevant to eavesdropper’s
(instantaneous or statistic) channel state information (ECSI).
Actually, in a real wiretap scenario, since the eavesdropper
is usually passive, even that detecting it is difficult, let alone
acquiring its CSI. In this regard, it is unrealistic to use ECSI-
relevant metrics to guide the design of secure transmissions.
In order to bridge the gap between the theoretical research of
PLS and its practical application, this letter studies the design
of secure transmissions without knowing the ECSI. When the
ECSI is lacking, a reasonable way to enhance the secrecy
would be to exploit all the available resources to make eaves-
dropping difficult while guaranteeing a certain level of quality
of service (QoS), e.g., high transmission reliability and low
delay, etc. Inspired by this, we introduce a new ECSI-irrelevant
metric to quantize the anti-eavesdropping ability (AEA) of a
secure transmission system, namely, the intrinsic ability that
the transmitter can exert negative impacts on the eavesdrop-
per via secrecy encoding in conjunction with artificial-noise-
aided (AN-aided) signaling. Our primary goal is to reach a
maximum AEA subject to certain QoS constraints. To this
end, we design both non-adaptive and adaptive transmission
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schemes based on the instantaneous and statistic CSIs of the
legitimate channel, respectively. In each scheme, we maximize
the AEA by jointly optimizing the encoding rates and the
power allocation between the information signal and the AN.
We establish an analytical relationship between the AEA and
SOP, and reveal the equivalence between maximizing the AEA
and minimizing the SOP for a worst-case scenario where
eavesdropper’s receiver noise is ignored.
We point out that several studies have also discussed the
design of secure transmissions without ECSI [7]-[10] or with
estimated ECSI [11], [12]. They have mainly focused on the
design of secrecy signaling, but encoding rates are not part of
their concern. However, in our work we consider a combined
design from the perspectives of secrecy channel encoding and
signaling with the aid of an ECSI-irrelevant metric.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider a secure transmission from anN -antenna trans-
mitter Alice to a single-antenna receiver Bob over a Rayleigh
fading channel in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. The
channel coefficient vectors of Bob and Eve are respectively
denoted by hb,he ∈ CN×1. We assume that the CSI of hb
is known at Alice, but that of he is not. We also assume
that the entries hb,i of hb and the receiver noise nb at Bob
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), obeying the
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and unit variance, i.e., hb,i, nb ∼ CN (0, 1).
For the purpose of secrecy, we adopt Wyner’s secrecy
encoding scheme [2] along with the null-space AN-aided
signaling technique [3] to confound Eve. For secrecy encoding,
we insert redundant information into confidential information,
and deliver the two parts with rates Re and Rs, respectively.
The rate of the entire codeword is thus Rt = Rs+Re. Denote
the channel capacities of Bob and Eve as Cb = log2(1 + γb)
and Ce = log2(1 + γe), where γb and γe are the respective
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs). If Cb is less
than Rt, a communication outage happens and Bob cannot
recover secret information. If Ce exceeds Re, secret informa-
tion might be decoded by Eve and a secrecy outage event is
said to have occurred. The SOP is defined as the probability
that the SINR γe lies above a threshold βe , 2
Re − 1, i.e.,
pso , P{γe > βe} [4]. As to secrecy signaling, we inject
isotropic AN into the null space of the legitimate channel such
that the transmitted signal is designed in the form of
x =
√
φPws+
√
(1− φ)P/(N − 1)Gv. (1)
In (1), s is the information-bearing signal with E[|s|2] = 1
and v ∼ C(N−1)×1 is an AN vector with i.i.d. entries vi ∼
CN (0, 1); P is the total transmit power of Alice subject to
2a power budget, i.e., P ≤ Pmax; φ ∈ [0, 1] is the power
allocation ratio such that the power of the transmitted signal
and the AN can be given by PS = φP and PA = (1 − φ)P ,
respectively; w = h†b/‖hb‖ is the beamforming vector for
Bob, and G ∈ CN×(N−1) is an AN weight matrix projecting
onto the null space of hb such that h
T
b G = 0, meaning that
the AN does not interfere with Bob. The SINRs of Bob and
Eve can be respectively given by
γb = PS‖hb‖2, (2)
γe =
PS |hTew|2
PA‖hTeG‖2/(N − 1) + σ2e
, (3)
where σ2e denotes the receiver noise power at the Eve side.
Note that Eve’s noise power σ2e is typically unknown to
Alice, then a robust approach is to design for the worst-case
scenario by ignoring Eve’s noise, i.e., σ2e = 0 [4]. Hence, the
SOP can be calculated from (3), given below,
pso = P {γe > βe} = P
{
PS |hTe w|2
PA‖hTeG‖2
>
βe
N − 1
}
. (4)
Since the wiretap channel he can be arbitrarily distributed, we
cannot assess the exact SOP. Nevertheless, we can rewrite (4)
as pso = P
{
(N − 1)|hTew|2/‖hTeG‖2 > PAβe/PS
}
. Inter-
estingly, regardless of the distribution of he, minimizing the
SOP is equivalent to maximizing the following metric in the
worst-case scenario,1
Ω ,
PA
PS
βe. (5)
This metric formally describes the collective negative im-
pact imposed on Eve: βe captures the confusion created against
illegal decoding via secrecy encoding; PA/PS captures the
degradation of the wiretap channel via AN-aided signaling.
The metric Ω itself has a specific physical significance,
i.e., it quantizes Alice’s intrinsic ability in terms of anti-
eavesdropping. In this sense, we refer to the metric Ω as
AEA. Distinguished from the SOP that relies heavily on the
knowledge of Eve’s statistic CSI, the AEA is completely
irrelevant to any parameters regarding to Eve. In this regard,
the AEA helps to guide an easy-to-implement PLS approach
for practical applications as it bypasses the assumption of the
availability of ECSI. In addition, once the distribution of he is
prior known, the AEA can also be used to evaluate the SOP.
We emphasize that with the metric AEA, the SOP can be
interpreted as the probability that the power gain of the signal
over the AN at Eve exceeds the AEA. Such a close relationship
actually reveals a fundamental principle of lifting the secrecy
level in the absence of ECSI, that is, in order to enhance the
secrecy we should maximize the AEA while guaranteeing a
reliable link to the intended receiver. Inspired by this, in this
letter we will tackle the problem of maximizing the AEA.
Recalling the secrecy encoding where Re = Rt − Rs, we
have βe = (βt − βs)/(1 + βs) with βt = 2Rt − 1 and βs =
2Rs − 1. Hence, the AEA in (5) can be rewritten as
Ω =
1− φ
φ
βt − βs
1 + βs
. (6)
1As we will show in the simulations, the maximum AEA actually yields
an SOP approaching the real minimum SOP for a more general case.
In order to avoid an undesired communication outage (i.e.,
βt > γb) or an intolerable high risk of secrecy outage (i.e.,
βe < γe), we follow an on-off criterion where Alice transmits
only when the channel gain ‖hb‖2 exceeds a pre-established
threshold µ; otherwise the transmission is suspended. Hence,
Alice has a transmission probability pt = P
{‖hb‖2 > µ},
which is directly related to the average delay, i.e., the larger pt
the shorter the expected delay [4]. Besides, due to the Rayleigh
fading, ‖hb‖2 is a normalized gamma variable with the shape
parameter N , and then pt can be computed as
pt = P
{‖hb‖2 > µ} = e−µ
N−1∑
k=0
µk
k!
. (7)
Since the encoding rates and the power allocation can be
dynamically adjusted according to channel realization, param-
eters φ, βt and βs are potentially functions of hb. Therefore,
the overall AEA under the on-off strategy can be given by
Ω¯ = Ehb
[
Ω(φ, βt, βs) | ‖hb‖2 > µ
]
. (8)
In the following sections, we aim at maximizing the overall
AEA Ω¯ while guaranteeing a minimum transmission proba-
bility δ, i.e., pt ≥ δ, and a minimum secrecy rate Rm, i.e.,
Rs ≥ Rm, or equivalently, βs ≥ βm , 2Rm − 1.
III. NON-ADAPTIVE SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
This section studies a non-adaptive secure transmission
(NAST) scheme where all the parameters are designed based
on the statistic CSI of hb and remain unchanged during the
transmission period. This scheme can be accomplished in an
off-line manner with a low implementation complexity.
It is obvious that in the NAST scheme the AEA, denoted
as Ωnast, is independent of hb. Hence, the conditioned ex-
pectation in (8) can be ignored and the overall AEA Ω¯nast
is described as (6). Since Alice transmits if ‖hb‖2 exceeds µ,
the condition βt ≤ φPµ < φP‖hb‖2 should be satisfied for
achieving a reliable transmission. Therefore, the problem of
maximizing the AEA can be formulated as follows:
max
P,φ,βt,βs,µ
Ωnast =
1− φ
φ
βt − βs
1 + βs
(9a)
s.t. βm < βs ≤ βt ≤ φPµ, (9b)
pt ≥ δ, (9c)
0 < P ≤ Pmax, (9d)
0 < φ < 1. (9e)
In what follows, we will solve the multi-variable problem
given above by successively designing the optimal parameters,
considering both multi- and single-antenna transmitter cases.
A. Multi-antenna Transmitter Case
The objective function in (9a) indicates that in order to
maximize Ωnast, we should first set βt to its maximum, which
is φPµ from (9b). Substituting β∗t = φPµ into (9a), we find
that for a given φ, Ωnast decreases with βs and increases with
P and µ, meaning that Ωnast is maximized at β
∗
s = βm,
P ∗ = Pmax and µ
∗ = µoN , where µ
o
N denotes the maximum
3of µ. Since pt decreases with µ, µ
o
N should make the constraint
(9c) active, i.e., P
{‖hb‖2 > µoN} = δ, and the value of µoN
can be efficiently calculated using the bisection method.
Substituting the optimal β∗t and β
∗
s into (6) yields
Ωnast(φ) =
1− φ
φ
φPmaxµ
o
N − βm
1 + βm
. (10)
Apparently, to achieve a positive Ωnast(φ), the minimum δ
and βm must satisfy the following inequality
Pmaxµ
o
N > βm. (11)
After some algebraic operations, we can prove Ωnast(φ)
concave on φ, and the maximum Ωnast(φ) is achieved at
dΩnast(φ)/dφ = 0 with the optimal φ
∗ =
√
βm/(PmaxµoN ).
The overall maximum AEA Ω¯∗nast can be eventually given by
Ω¯∗nast = Ω
∗
nast =
(√
PmaxµoN −
√
βm
)2
1 + βm
. (12)
B. Single-antenna Transmitter Case
If Alice has a single transmit antenna, the null-space AN
can no longer be realized and the leaked AN will also
interfere with Bob. In this case, the SINR of Bob changes
to γb = φP |hb|2/
(
(1− φ)P |hb|2 + 1
)
. We can formulate
the AEA maximization problem similarly as problem (9a),
simply with constraints (9b) and (9c) modified to βt ≤
φPµ/ [(1− φ)Pµ+ 1] and pt = P
{|hb|2 > µ} = e−µ, re-
spectively. Afterwards, we can successively determine the op-
timal parameters, namely, P ∗ = Pmax, µ
∗ = µo1 , ln
1
δ
, β∗s =
βm, β
∗
t =
√
Pmaxµo1βm, and φ
∗ =
√
βm
Pmaxµ
o
1
1+Pmaxµ
o
1
1+
√
Pmaxµ
o
1βm
.
The condition for achieving a positive AEA is Pmaxµ
o
1 > βm,
and the resulting overall AEA is given by
Ω¯∗nast = Ω
∗
nast =
(√
Pmaxµo1 −
√
βm
)2
(1 + βm) (1 + Pmaxµo1)
. (13)
The design procedure above shows a strong coupling be-
tween the encoding rates and power allocation. This proves
the necessity of combining secrecy channel encoding and sig-
naling in guaranteeing wireless secrecy. The obtained solutions
give some useful insights into both system performance and
design guidelines for practical secure transmissions.
1) For the sake of anti-eavesdropping, Alice should transmit
with full power, even though this would strengthen Eve’s
signal. This is because only higher transmit power can support
a larger codeword rate such that a larger redundant rate can
be attained against eavesdropping. Likewise, a small secrecy
rate beyond the required minimum one is preferred.
2) We can prove the optimal power allocation φ∗ decreasing
with N by realizing that µoN increases with N . This indicates
that higher power is allowed to be devoted to the AN injection
with more transmit antennas. Besides, φ∗ increases with Rs
since higher power should be ensured for sending the useful
signal to support the target secrecy rate.
3) There exists a non-trivial trade-off between secrecy and
delay under the on-off strategy. The condition of a positive
AEA shows that the requirements of a low transmission delay
(i.e., a large δ) and a large secrecy rate Rm cannot be
satisfied simultaneously. In other words, enhancing the secrecy
performance is at the cost of increasing the transmission delay.
4) Comparing the AEAs in (12) and (13), we observe that
apart from an array gain loss (as µoN > µ
o
1), the single-antenna
case suffers a performance loss arisen from the leaked AN,
i.e., 1/(1 + Pmaxµ
o
1). This highlights the superiority of multi-
antenna techniques in improving wireless secrecy. In addition,
as power budget Pmax increases, the AEA in (12) increases
continuously whereas that in (13) tends to a constant 1/(1 +
βm) which is bottlenecked by the required secrecy rate Rm.
IV. ADAPTIVE SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
To improve the AEA further, this section studies an adaptive
secure transmission (AST) scheme where the fading status of
channel hb is adequately exploited. In this case, all the parame-
ters are adaptively adjusted according to the instantaneous CSI
of hb, that is, they are functions of hb.
Recalling (8), we find that for a given threshold µ, if we
maximize Ωast(hb) under an arbitrary hb, the overall AEA
Ω¯ast is naturally maximized. Therefore, we can first focus on
maximization of Ωast(hb) for a fixed µ, and then determine the
optimal µ to maximize Ω¯ast. Since Alice knows hb, she can
set codeword rate Rt to the channel capacity of the legitimate
channel Cb, i.e., βt = γb = φP‖hb‖2. The AEA maximization
problem is thus formulated as follows:
max
P,φ,βs
Ωast(hb) =
1− φ
φ
γb − βs
1 + βs
(14a)
s.t. βm ≤ βs < γb, (14b)
0 < φ < 1, (14c)
0 < P ≤ Pmax. (14d)
Since problems (14a) and (9a) share a unified optimization
procedure for a fixed µ, the detailed design is omitted here due
to space limitation. We finally obtain the optimal parameters
in the AST scheme by replacing µoN in the NAST case with
‖hb‖2. Understanding that Ω∗ast(hb) increases with ‖hb‖2, we
can prove from (8) that the overall AEA is maximized if
threshold µ reaches the maximum value, i.e., µ∗ = µoN with
µoN defined previously. Similar conclusions can be developed
as in the NAST case. For example, the power resource should
be completely utilized to maximize the AEA. In addition to
the delay-secrecy trade-off, a rate-secrecy trade-off is captured
in power allocation, e.g., increasing AN power benefits the
secrecy but might fail to support a high secrecy rate. Only
when the quality of the legitimate channel is good enough
(a large ‖hb‖2) and meanwhile the secrecy rate constraint is
moderate (a small Rm), can higher AN power be permitted
for degrading the wiretap channel.
Substituting the optimal Ω∗ast(hb) and µ
∗ into (8) yields the
maximum overall AEA. As expected, the positive AEA con-
dition ‖hb‖2 > µoN > βm/Pmax always yields Ω∗ast(hb) >
Ω∗nast. This indicates, due to an adaptive design, the AST
scheme outperforms the NAST scheme in terms of the overall
AEA, i.e., Ω¯∗ast > Ω¯
∗
nast. However, in the single-antenna case
when Pmax or |hb|2 increases to infinity, Ω∗ast(hb) approaches
the same constant as Ω∗nast, i.e., 1/(1 + βm) .
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Fig. 1: Maximum overall AEA Ω¯∗ and minimum overall SOP p¯∗
so
vs. N and
δ, with Pmax = 10 dBm and βm = 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results on the AEAs as well
as the corresponding SOPs. The comparison between the SOPs
with and without the ECSI is also provided.
For simplicity, we consider a single-antenna Eve with
Rayleigh fading channels. After some algebraic operations,
we express the SOP pso(hb) as a function of the AEA Ω(hb),
pso(hb) =


e
−
σ2eΩ(hb)
P (1−φ)(1−Ω(hb)) , N = 1,
e−
σ2eΩ(hb)
P (1−φ)
(
1 + Ω(hb)
N−1
)1−N
, N ≥ 2.
(15)
Using the optimal parameters obtained previously, the mini-
mum overall SOP can be given by
p¯∗so = Ehb
[
p∗so(hb) | ‖hb‖2 > µ∗
]
. (16)
Fig. 1 plots the maximum overall AEA Ω¯∗ and the cor-
responding minimum overall SOP p¯∗so as functions of N for
different values of δ. Simulation results match well with the
theoretical values, verifying the correctness of our analyses.
A consistent one-to-one match between Ω¯∗ and p¯∗so is shown.
The delay-secrecy trade-off is also well captured: A more
moderate delay constraint (a smaller δ) yields a larger AEA (a
smaller SOP), and vice verser. As expected, the AST scheme
remarkably outperforms the NAST one in terms of secrecy,
although at the expense of a higher implement complexity.
Fig. 2 compares the overall SOP under our methods (i.e.,
maximizing the AEA without ECSI) and under an exhaustive
method (i.e., minimizing the SOP via (15) using the ECSI).
We show that the multi-antenna technique plays a significant
role in enhancing wireless secrecy. Moreover, the AEA-based
SOP approaches the ECSI-based SOP for quite a wide range
of Pmax, and they even merge when Pmax is sufficiently
large. This demonstrates the superiority of using the AEA to
design secure transmissions when the ECSI cannot be prior
known, since the ECSI-irrelevant approach is much easier to
implement in practice than those ECSI-based mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This letter considers a secure transmission where secrecy
encoding and AN-aided signaling are jointly exploited for anti-
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vs. Pmax and N , with βm = 1 and δ = 0.9.
eavesdropping when the ECSI is unknown. An ECSI-irrelevant
metric AEA is introduced, and both non-adaptive and adaptive
schemes are designed to maximize the AEA. Analyses and
numerical results show that maximizing the AEA is equivalent
to minimizing the SOP, demonstrating the superiority of using
AEA to guide secure transmission designs without the ECSI.
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